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Abstract
The essay deals with how one can predict a state’s behaviour through discourse 
analysis. It argues that while actors must have a real capacity for action, their re-
spective discourse must also house a conceptualization of that capacity in order 
for an actor to be expected to make decisions to employ said action. Instruments 
of power must also be perceived as effective in order to be employed. The essay 
combines theories to analyze discourse from an instrumental power perspective,
in order to make a characterization of an agent’s likely employment of instru-
ments of power. The author then proceeds to test the practical application of this 
perspective by making a discourse analysis on statements concerning peace and 
security made by the Chinese delegation to the Security Council. The conclusion 
is that while this perspective has its limitations it is an effective way to make 
quick assessments on a states instrumental power discourse and thus is a useful 
tool in predicting a state’s, or other actor’s, behaviour.
Keywords: china, discourse theory, power analysis, instrumental power discourse, 
foreign policy, state character
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11 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
The original purpose of this essay was to assess what kind of power China is and 
the considerations that need to be made in correlation to this. Taking a discourse 
standpoint however I do not intend to examine Chinese power in real or ideologi-
cal terms but the discourse in which China makes its policy decisions. A common 
definition of power is that a country is powerful if it has a large population and 
territory, extensive natural resources, economic strength, military force and social 
stability (Nye 2004, p 3). While some would argue that China does not fulfil this 
last characteristic, in light of Tibet, Xinjiang and its complicated relationship to 
Taiwan, the strength of neither of the aforementioned characteristics can be ig-
nored. Addressing what kind of power China is becomes relevant because of 
China’s rapid ascension to becoming a world power not just in strictly economic 
terms but others as well, such as in the scientific field where China has shifted the 
balance of power and made the triad of the US, EU and Japan, a tetrad (p. 86). It 
also becomes interesting in light of the current discussion on different kinds of
powers, where the EU has been characterized as a normative power, stressing the 
particularity of the union (Sjursen 2006, p. 169), and thereby describing it as
something different from what could be considered a conventional power. In light 
of this the possibility that China also is another kind of power presents itself. As a 
result of this, another problem surfaces, how does one characterize a power? In 
order to do this some form of reference points need to be established, as all pow-
ers could be considered unique and also the same.
The purpose as such is to try and characterize what kind of power China is,
however in order to do this a framework for making characterizations of a power 
is necessary. Hence this essay also attempts to develop an analytical perspective
for the purpose of analyzing the character of a state. 
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2.1 Framing of the problem
As the purpose stated I will attempt to make an assessment of what manner of 
power China is and what implications this brings with it. Since China is an emerg-
ing power in so many ways with new economic ties and a growing military its 
power can be seen in a myriad of settings and perspectives. Therefore, to make an 
assessment possible, one must narrow the perspective. To narrow down the per-
spective this essay looks to the UN, or the Security Council to be exact. However 
the essay will try to make a conclusion that encompasses more and try to establish 
a number of reference points in order to make a fruitful assessment of what kind 
of power China is. There are a number of ways in which this task could be under-
taken, however I have chosen to analyze this problem using a discourse perspec-
tive. This is a rewarding approach since it makes it possible to study the Chinese 
power identity directly by looking at statements made by Chinese officials. From 
this, the following questions can be derived as guidance:
 How does China view power? Or. What does Chinese power dis-
course look like?
 What kind of power is China? Or. Through which power discourse 
does China act?
The question pairs are deliberately asked both in general and from a strict dis-
course perspective, because while discourse analysis may be a growing field it is 
still not without its opponents. But for the purpose of the problem this essay at-
tempts to examine it is a powerful tool, which I also intend to both theoretically 
and practically show in this essay.
Moving on to the aforementioned reference points, these must be established 
in order for the analysis to become useful. One must be able to fit the Chinese dis-
course in a system in order to establish what considerations should be made in re-
lation to China. These reference points will not be made strictly from a discourse 
theoretical perspective but will borrow concepts from the theoretical discourse on 
power and relating these to other powers. There are two interesting powers to look 
to at world level, the US and the EU, more players exist of course but calling 
these key ones hardly seems controversial. Using these two as reference points is 
interesting as they are two very different powers. The US is often described as a 
3hard power and the EU as a normative or soft power. In order to establish these 
reference points important questions are:
 What characterizes these different kinds of power or uses of power?
 How do these characteristics apply to different powers?
Establishing this makes it possible to then fit the Chinese notion of power into a 
system to help explain and predict Chinese foreign policy. In effect this essay re-
lies on one hypothesis:
 By uncovering an agent’s instrumental power discourse one can as-
sess what instruments of policy are conceived as available to it and 
as a result make predictions on said agent’s behaviour.
2.2 Theoretical framework
The essay’s point of departure is a discourse perspective, where “language is con-
structed in a number of patterns that we follow when acting in different social 
domains [...] a discourse is one determined way to speak of and understand the 
world.”  (Winther & Phillips 2000, p. 7 translated here). The manner in which the 
author aims to examine the problem is that which is generally called discourse 
theory, as developed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, in which “all social 
phenomena can be analyzed with discourse analytical tools” (Winther & Phillips 
2000, p. 31). It is possible to view the relations between states as an international 
society or a society of states (Scholte 1993, p 14). Indeed power itself can be 
viewed as insignificant without this international society since from a relational 
power perspective “any power instrument becomes a potential power resource 
only if its control is seen to be valued by other actors in the interaction, power 
comes out of this relation not from the power holder alone” (Guzzini, p 452-453), 
a view of power that resonates well with the discourse perspective that is this es-
says point of departure, because while power must be valued by the others actors 
it must also be valued by the actor. What kind of power China values becomes an 
interesting variable for study since China is emerging as an agent with power ca-
pacities no matter what your perspective is on what constitutes power.
In order to characterize the previously mentioned reference points, the US and 
the EU, I’m going to use Joseph S. Nye Jr’s (2004) distinction between hard and 
soft power as this is a fitting way of dividing up the two.
2.2.1 Discourse
Since this essay takes a discourse perspective this section attempts to, as briefly as 
possible, summarize the concept of discourse that is intended to be used. Dis-
4course as described by Laclau and Mouffe “captures the idea that all objects and 
actions are meaningful” (Howarth 2000, p. 101). Depending on the discourse in 
which they are presented objects and actions are given different meaning, the in-
vasion of Normandy was a victory to one side and a loss to the other, the start of 
European liberation and a mark of the end of a dream for Germany. This takes 
place in a discursive structure of articulation. The practice of articulation is char-
acterized by the construction of nodal points which partially fixate the system. 
However this is always partially on account of the openness of society, society is 
ever changing and therefore can never be fully fixated (Howarth 2000, p. 102).
This discursive structure is primarily articulated in language but Laclau and 
Mouffe differ from the conventional linguistic approach claiming that systems of 
social relations are constituted and organized through discourse, discourse is not 
merely a cognitive template (Howarth 2000, p. 102-103). Laclau and Mouffe 
make a distinction between contingent elements and necessary moments of a par-
ticular discourse. A particular discourse is a temporary partial fixation of mean-
ing, however the contingency of meaning prevents this fixation from ever being 
fully realized (Howarth 2000, p 103). In other terms social relations are consti-
tuted and organized by a discursive structure (language and actions) which how-
ever is always in flux. It is therefore never fully realized but one is able to take a 
snapshot of this structure in order to analyze it.
Discourses are also constituted in relation to other discourses, “a discourse al-
ways requires a discursive ‘outside’ to constitute itself [...] as discourses are rela-
tional entities whose identity rely on their differentiation from other discourses”
(Howarth 2000, p. 103).
A final clarification that should be made is that discourse theory does not 
claim that there is no real world outside of discourse, it simply claims that this 
world does not have any extra-discursive meaning and stresses the material nature 
of discourse itself, blurring the line between an objective world and one defined 
through language (Howarth 2000, p. 104)
2.3 Analytical variables
2.3.1 Floating significant
A floating significant is defined as a term that different discourses try to define in 
their own way (Winther & Phillips 2000, p. 35). The floating significant this essay 
is trying to examine in relation to China is “Power” or rather instruments of 
power. The use of the term “Power” when dealing with discourse theory is diffi-
cult since power in discourse theory is normally defined as the force that mani-
fests the social (Winther & Phillips 2000, p 45). However I do not employ the 
term power for this purpose, instead I look at the conceptualization of instrumen-
5tal power in the international sphere, what power is defined as in Chinese foreign 
policy discourse and how this definition fits into the academic power discourse.
By looking at how power is conceived by China we also get an image of how 
China is likely to exercise and act as a power, first however there is a need for a
definition of instruments of power to start with, a task that will be dealt with in 
section 3.
2.3.2 Antagonisms
In subscribing to Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory certain elements of dis-
course become valid points for study. Antagonisms in discourse theory “occur be-
cause social agents are unable to attain their identities… Thus the task of the dis-
course analyst is to describe the ways in which the identities of the agents are 
blocked, and to chart the different means by which these obstacles are constructed 
in antagonistic terms by social agents” (Howarth 2000, p. 105). These are impor-
tant to uncover since they are “constitutive of social objectivity, as identity is al-
ways threatened by something that is external to it. […] antagonisms reveal the 
boundaries or political frontiers of a social formation” (Howarth 2000, p. 106). By 
finding the antagonisms in the Chinese discourse one is able to find the bounda-
ries of Chinese identity and how it is constituted in relation to the other.
2.3.3 Subjectivity 
The second variable for analysis, subjectivity, is related to the question of agency 
in social interactions. A distinction is made between subject position and political 
subjectivity (Howarth 2000, p. 108) where subject position is the same as the sub-
ject (Winther & Phillips 2000, p. 48). Subject positions are the ways in which an 
agent identifies itself, for instance “Christian” or “Black”. The same agent may 
regard itself as belonging to one or more of these identities depending on which 
are available in the given setting or context. The concept of political subjectivity 
then captures the way in which these social agents act. Simply calling it the set-
ting for their identification is unsatisfactory since in Laclau and Mouffe’s theory 
of discourse “the subject is not simply determined by the structure; nor, however 
does it constitute the structure” (Howarth 2000, p. 109). The ever changing nature 
of discourse in Laclau and Mouffe’s view make any rigid discourse structures im-
possible, nor  is it however a complete chaos making an assessment possible.
2.3.4 Hegemony
The concept of hegemony in discourse theory serves to illustrate (like discourse) 
the fixation of elements in motion, since discourses are ever changing and there 
ma simultaneously exist different antagonizing discourses. The hegemonic inter-
6vention cuts across these antagonizing discourses creating a new fixation, an in-
tervention successful if one discourse dominates where there was previously an-
tagonism. Such as when the discourse defining people from their nationality pre-
vailed over that defining people from their class before World War I (Winther & 
Phillips 2000, p. 55). This essay however will not concern itself with finding a 
global discourse in hegemonic stature even though it is this setting in which the 
discourse analysis takes place. Such an analysis requires a wider scope but unveil-
ing the Chinese discourse will at least help show one of the possibly antagonizing 
discourses. In using discourse analysis in the manner this essay intends, one must 
be mindful of potentially existing hegemonic discourses.
2.3.5 Logics of equivalence 
Constructing logics of equivalence is a tool of discourse analysis. Specifics signs
(words) of a discourse are given meaning through a system of distinctions. A spe-
cific sign needs to be examined as opposed to other signs (Bergström & Boréus 
2005, p 317). For instance the sign “security” receives a positive connotation to 
for instance “regional stability” and a negative connotation to, say, “terrorism”. 
Constructing these logics of equivalence we are able to better view the Chinese 
discourse and by examining which of these elements are key building blocks 
(nodal points) that fixate the discourse and around which other elements of the 
discourse circulate (Bergström & Boréus 2005, p. 318).
2.4 Empirical records
In order to examine the Chinese discourse on the subject the author looks at the
Chinese permanent representatives to the UN’s statements on peace and security 
issues from the present and the last three years. These statements serve as suffi-
cient documents for what the essay is trying to examine. The representatives’ 
statements will serve as avatars for the subject we are trying to examine. This is 
acceptable from a discourse perspective since “the autonomous self becomes a 
medium for the culture and its language” (Kvale 1992 cited in Winther & Phillips 
2000, p 21 translated here). It is therefore reasonable to look at these statements,
as they are likely to be (or necessarily so) a reflection of the Chinese peace and 
security discourse, a discourse closely related to the instrumental power discourse 
we wish to analyze. Since the statements are made in an international setting this 
also makes them more attractive for analysis since it is China set in an interna-
tional context that is the focus of the essay. One problem with this material is of 
course that the setting is blurred in rhetoric, making it somewhat difficult to dis-
cern what could be considered Chinese conceptualized discourse and what is sim-
ply “politeness”. As such references to peace and security as a combined concept 
will be omitted from analysis, since it is a concept found in strict security council 
7discourse, as the UN charter confers the “Security Council primary responsibility 
for the maintenance of international peace and security” (UN charter, article 24).
Looking at discourse over time also gives us the possibility to discern poten-
tial changes in said discourse, and gives us an indication of the structural integrity 
of that discourse.
It could be argued, somewhat justified, that a more fitting empirical focus 
would be on the domestic debate within the upper echelons of the Chinese com-
munist party but this is practically cumbersome for two reasons: One, China is not 
the most transparent society and therefore records are not always made official, 
the “real” nature of a state is hard to discern in a country where most of its politics 
are kept secret (Roskin & Berry 2005, p. 272). Two, the analyst’s knowledge of 
Chinese language is slim to none.
2.5 Definitions
 Power
Power is as already pointed out a difficult concept when dealing with discourse 
theory since a power theory is part of discourse theory. This essay however also 
concerns itself with another dimension of power.
Discourse theory adheres to Foucault’s definition of power which defines 
power not as the property of agents but as the constructive and restraining force 
that conditions the social. Our social world and the separation of objects is pro-
duced in power (Winther & Phillips 1999, p 20).
Another definition of power could be expressed as “A exercises power over B 
when A affects B in a manner contrary to B’s interests” (Lukes 1974, 2005, p 37). 
This definition is agent based as power is distributed among agents, and describes 
how different agents affect each other.
The essay primarily uses the latter definition but the first is a necessary prem-
ise of the discourse analytical perspective that will be used. One should also note 
how this is distinguished from the noun “a power” used to characterize the states 
being analyzed.
 Instrumental Power Discourse
This concept may seem elusive but can be defined as such: An instrumental 
power discourse is the discourse within which one finds the instruments con-
ceived by an agent to be employed in order to reach desired outcomes.
 Chinese
Defining Chinese may seem superfluous, but this is to avoid confusion. In this es-
say Chinese is considered something stemming from the Chinese government. As 
such this essay does not concern itself with anything else and cultural and national 
connotations should be disregarded.
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3.1 Power – conscious and unconscious
There are a myriad of ways to look at power and a number of ways to analyze it. 
Steven Lukes (1974, 2005) in his work “Power: A Radical view” defines the con-
cept of power as follows: “A exercises power over B when A affects B in a man-
ner contrary to B’s interests” (p. 37). This definition has however been criticized 
since it has an ethical implication, on account of Lukes’ separation of perceived 
and real interests. In order to discern B’s real interest we are forced to make an 
ethical judgment (Hay 2002, p 182-183). Hay’s definition defines power as being 
context shaping, the ability to redefine the parameters of other actors (2002, p. 
185). In this essay we will however leave this discussion aside since the normative 
aspects of power usage does not concern it. Lukes (2005), however in his later 
works admitted that this view was to narrow and focused merely on the exercise 
of power (p. 109), but the definition is useful to this essay since it is an exerciser 
of power it intends to examine.
For the purpose of this essay another aspect of Lukes' theory deserves to be 
examined. Lukes addresses this by looking at the problem of unconscious use of 
power. “Can A properly be said to exercise power over B where the knowledge of 
the effects of A on B is just not available to A?” (Lukes 1974, 2005, p. 53). Lukes 
answer to this is that if the lack of knowledge depends on A’s remediable failure 
to find out, yes. But if the lack of knowledge is because say factual evidence is out 
of A’s reach, then to talk of power use seems to lose all point (Lukes 1974,2005 p. 
53-54). This distinction seems to relate more to the question of culpability (Hey-
ward 2007, p. 53), but the distinction between a conscious and unconscious use of 
power is what this essay focuses on.
As such A exercises conscious power over B when A is aware of the use of 
power, respectively A exercises unconscious power over B when A is unaware of 
his use of power. This further distinction is important since it gives us access to
another level of agent analysis. While it may seem as though it is necessary to 
study an actors conscious as well as unconscious influences on other actors, one 
can also assume that an actor is likely to make his decisions on how to act from a 
conscious perspective, since making decisions unconsciously seems, and is, con-
tradictory. Power in discourse theory was defined as the productive and restrain-
ing force through which the social was produced (Winther & Phillips 1999, p 20). 
We can as such define discourse as the defining parameters of that consciousness.
9Another aspect of this conscious and unconscious approach is that the ends for 
which power usage is the means also have to be consciously conceptualized. An 
agent has to have a conceptualization of a desired outcome in order to formulate a 
strategy to reach this outcome. From this distinction between conscious and un-
conscious power I will look at some more factually based conceptions of power.
3.2 Instrumental power and discourse
How can different conceptions of instruments of power and their usage be related 
to and encompassed into discourse theory? Or rather what is the benefit of the dis-
course perspective? It is possible that this could be made in a number of ways but 
this essay employs a strategy which rests on the concept of “statecraft”, tradition-
ally defined “as the art of conducting state affairs” (Baldwin 1985, p. 8). To study 
statecraft is to examine the “instruments used by policy makers in their attempts 
to exercise power” (Baldwin 1985, p. 9). “Policy making involves making deci-
sions, and decision making involves choosing among alternative courses of ac-
tion.” (Baldwin 1985, p. 15), and as part of this decision making cost-benefit cal-
culations are necessary. Here the turn to a discourse perspective becomes interest-
ing. Instead of simply trying to establish what instruments are available to a cer-
tain actor, using a discourse perspective this essay examines what instruments are 
conceived as available, what is considered a cost and what is considered a benefit.
The discourse perspective implies that while discourse is always changing, agents 
are still in effect trapped within their respective discourse. Discerning what in-
struments are conceived as available within a specific discourse becomes a power-
ful tool for predicting foreign policy. Since any agent (rational or other) must 
make decisions from the choices available to that specific agent, choices that are 
conceptualized through discourse. Discourse is the conscious space within an 
agent makes his choices. It could also be expressed as: While power can be meas-
ured in factual capacities, mental capacities (discourse) must also be taken into 
account.
Laura J. Shepherd (2008) has shown how discourse can help to explain justifi-
cations in foreign policy and how international discourse can change the rules of 
the game. The occupation of Iraq for instance was made possible through discur-
sive fidelity on conventional “logics of security” (pp. 294, 310). Her argument 
applies to a common international discourse but is applicable to this essay as well.
In order for an action to be undertaken the agent of that action must be part of a 
discourse that houses the concept of said action.
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4 Characterizations of power
4.1 Hard power – Soft power
Using a distinction between hard and soft power does not mean that this dividing 
up of power is all-encompassing or even the only way of looking at different uses 
of power, but as previously mentioned the analysis needs some reference points 
and this distinction is useful, as we will see, in trying to describe the differences 
between the two most prominent powers in the world, the US and the EU.
Joseph S Nye coined the term soft power and makes a distinction between this 
and hard power. Nye talks of the emerging importance of this concept as the na-
ture of power has changed into a three-dimensional chess game, where one can 
win both by playing horizontally as well as vertically. Hard power is defined as 
power in a more traditional sense, measured in military and economic assets, the 
ability to use inducements and threats in order to make others change their posi-
tion, coercion for short. Soft power on the other hand takes into account that a 
country sometimes may reach the desired outcome without the use of threats but
simply because other countries admire its values and prosperity and want to fol-
low it. Getting others to want what you want, soft power is the ability to change 
the preferences of others, or persuasion for short (Nye 2004, p 4-5).
Relating this to our examination of China we should be able to see whether or 
not Chinese power discourse has room for the concept of soft power. Is China 
conscious in its soft power use or does China show little concern for soft power
considerations, still being a one-dimensional player in a three-dimensional game 
(Nye 2004, p. 5), a statement that resonates well with the previously made distinc-
tion between conscious and unconscious power usage.
Power comes from attraction, and soft power is a staple of daily democratic 
business (Nye 2004, p. 6). While China is not a democracy and therefore not as 
dependent on soft power considerations in domestic politics these considerations 
must be made in a international environment since the international system with 
the UN is a quasi-democratic system, at least in theory.
Nye states the difference between hard and soft power in degrees and the rela-
tionship between them is not perfect in the sense that some resources are applica-
ble both from a hard power as well as a soft power perspective. He does however 
claim that the relationship between certain behaviours and the different power di-
mensions is strong enough to allow for certain shorthand references to behaviours 
stemming from hard and soft power employment. Nye also concludes that typical 
resources employed by a hard power are force, sanctions, payments and bribes 
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while typical resources employed by a soft power are institutions, values, culture 
and policies (Nye 2004, p 7-8). This division is especially useful in the analysis of
instrumental power discourse.
4.1.1 Instruments of hard and soft power
David A. Baldwin (1985) defines four instruments of statecraft that can also be 
applied to foreign policy: 
1. Propaganda refers to influence attempts relying primarily on the delib-
erate manipulation of verbal symbols.
2. Diplomacy refers to influence attempts relying primarily on negotiation.
3. Economic statecraft refers to influence attempts relying primarily on re-
sources which have a reasonable semblance of a market price in terms 
of money
4. Military statecraft refers to influence attempts relying primarily on vio-
lence, weapons, or force.
(p. 13-14)
While these categories of policy are often overlapping, Baldwin (1985) concludes 
that it is possible to make a reasonable judgement on which of them is the primary 
basis of the attempted influence (p. 14).  The easiest way to divide these up be-
tween hard and soft power is by simply by dubbing Propaganda and Diplomacy 
soft power instruments and Economic and Military statecraft hard power instru-
ment. While this may, prima facie, seem as a sufficient mode of action it is not. 
While it is relatively safe to say that a state relying primarily on propaganda and 
diplomacy could be named a soft power user the two latter categories are more 
ambiguous than that. In foreign policy, economic statecraft can mean both sanc-
tions (hard power) and aid (a combination of hard and soft power). While aid can 
serve as a carrot it can also be part of public diplomacy: “Philanthropic programs 
are one of the means that nations have to cultivate their images.” (Zhang 2006, p. 
26). Likewise participation in peacekeeping or humanitarian interventions may be 
employed for similar purposes. It could of course be argued that in these cases it is 
simply a case of what is known as public diplomacy measures, which can be ac-
credited to propaganda (el-Nawawy 2006, p. 186). Trying however to fit ambigu-
ous cases into a category that doesn’t fully account for the scope of the action is 
unsatisfactory. To compensate for this, another quality aspect is added to the two 
latter categories, a distinction between measures that try to influence by way of 
coercion and measures that try to influence by way of persuasion. This makes it 
easier to divide the different instruments between hard and soft power. Coercive 
military and economic means are hard power and persuasive military and eco-
nomic means are soft power. While this gives us six categories it is still a useful 
and relatively simple distinction to follow. The reason for this conceptualization 
of different instruments is that these definitions will make it easier to detect the ar-
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ticulation of different instruments of power in a governments instrumental power 
discourse.
4.1.2 A consciously hard power: The US
The US can be characterized as a hard power in a number of ways. For one it has 
been argued that the US does not see the use of force or even going to war as a 
necessary failure of policy. The US sees the utilization of coercive diplomacy and
a militarized approach to foreign policy as a whole and therefore conceptualizes
foreign policy issues in military terms (Dunn 2003 p 286-287). In other terms: 
“When you see yourself as a hammer, everything looks like a nail” (Dunn 2003 p. 
287). This reliance on hard power instruments translates into the military opera-
tions as well as, the US has approached all wars since Vietnam “with the use of 
overwhelming decisive force” (Dunn 2003 p. 287). This stems in part from linger-
ing cold-war logic but its roots can be found even earlier and can be related to an 
American self-image birthed in a discourse of danger (Campbell 1998, p. 48-49, 
171), and a perhaps simplified worldview constituted as divided between good 
and evil (Kagan 2003, p. 4).
This conceptualized hard power approach could be contested on a number of 
points of course, for instance the US has launched multimillion dollar public di-
plomacy campaigns in the Middle East following 9/11 (el-Nawawy 2006, p. 183),
but it serves as a useful template for this essay. In line with the hypothesis out-
lined at the beginning of this essay the US foreign policy discourse could be char-
acterized as a hard power discourse, limiting the conceived instruments available 
to the US. As a result one can predict that US policy makers will rely on hard 
power instruments and soft power instruments can be left out of the equation.
4.1.3 A consciously soft power: The EU
In dubbing the EU a soft power this essay takes into account how the EU is often 
characterized as a normative power. In Nye’s own words soft power correlates to 
how a country may achieve its desired outcome because “other countries – admir-
ing its value [...] want to follow it” (Nye 2004, p. 5). Normative power seems to 
be this applied in practice. European countries for instance spend much more re-
sources on public diplomacy than America (Nye 2004, p. 82). Part of this policy 
has been credited to the lack of military means, making it a civilian power 
(Sjursen 2006, p. 237), with this lack of hard power means the turn to soft power 
comes naturally as this has become a strong interest in light of its relative weak-
ness (Kagan 2003, p. 37). From this standpoint it can be argued that the EU, for 
instance, uses the insistence on Human Rights as part of furthering strategic inter-
ests (Youngs 2004, p. 421).
Previously I pointed to how the American reliance on hard power stemmed 
from certain characteristics of American state identity, a similar logic can be 
found in the case of the EU as “ethics are intrinsic to the identity of the EU.” (Ag-
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gestam 2008, p. 4) “As a ‘responsible power’, the EU would then be expected to 
follow certain rules of action based on a concern for the well-being of others. 
From this it follows that strategies of persuasion, negotiation and dialogue are fa-
voured over coercion.” (Aggestam 2008 p. 9). Whether this turn to soft power in-
struments stems from a lack of military means or a change in the common identity 
of the member states, the EU can, like the US, for the purpose of this essay serve 
as a template of a soft power user.
4.2 Smart Power
Smart power has been defined “as the capacity of an actor to combine elements of 
hard power and soft power in ways that are mutually reinforcing such that the ac-
tor’s purposes are advanced effectively and efficiently.” (Wilson 2008, p. 115).
This concept does not really make the analytical framework developed for this es-
say less complicated, rather it complicates it further. The reason it is forwarded is 
that Wilson (2008) claims that China, by the strategic use of resources, has shown 
aptitude for the use of smart power (p. 111). As such one must re-evaluate 
whether the simple dividing of soft and hard power is sufficient to describe Chi-
nese power discourse. At the outset of this essay I pointed to the possibility of 
China being a different kind of power. The concept of smart power does not ren-
der the previously forwarded theories void, however a qualitative aspect must be 
added. The definition outlining smart power is the dual use of soft and hard 
power, however simply using them both does not automatically make it smart 
power. They have to be applied in such a manner that they are mutually reinforc-
ing. This application aspect makes it unsuitable for the linguistics discourse analy-
sis that this essay undertakes, since one cannot know how the application of 
power actually is made. One could however conclude the existence of a potential 
smart power, should elements of both soft power and hard power discourses be 
uncovered. The purpose of the current discourse approach is rather to rule out cer-
tain actions than to imply exactly which actions will be taken, it is about narrow-
ing down the choices of an actor through looking at what actions are housed in 
their respective discourse. Moreover Wilson’s definition does not give any indica-
tion of exactly how this interplay of hard and soft power is supposed to be applied 
in order to work in a mutually reinforcing manner. It is expressed as knowing the 
effects of each instrument of statecraft at your disposal (Wilson 2008, p. 115). 
Since this vague definition of smart power seems to provide us little use in analy-
sis one could question why it is brought up. This is to show that in making an as-
sessment of an agent one must be mindful of the possibility of the existence of 
other not previously conceived instruments in their discourse. An analysis also 
takes place from within a discourse and it is not a given that the analyst’s dis-
course will house a wider array of instruments than the subject for analysis. 
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4.3 A responsible power?
China has tried to characterize itself as a responsible power, as “China shoulders 
broad international obligations, and plays a responsible and constructive role.”
(www.china.org.cn). The characteristics of a responsible power in China’s view 
seem to imply an agent who concerned with peace promotion and world develop-
ment, together with its own development. Relying on “the Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence, China has developed friendly, cooperative relations with 
other countries and promoted peaceful coexistence and equal treatment among 
countries” (www.china.org.cn)
Being a friendly neighbour and focusing on the importance of negotiation 
seems to imply an emphasis on soft power instruments as persuasion takes prece-
dence of coercion. Following the argument forwarded by Aggestam that persua-
sion and dialogue are favoured actions for a responsible power (Aggestam 2008, 
p. 9). So in order for us to characterize China as a responsible power we need to 
show that the Chinese instrumental power discourse correlates with soft power 
characteristics.
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5 Analysis
5.1 A perspective for analysis
How then to conceptualize the perspective for analyzing the instrumental power 
discourse of a government? The previous sections have dealt with the theory of 
discourse and different conceptualizations of power. I now move on to compile 
these into a perspective for analysis. One basic hypothesis laid out in the begin-
ning of the essay was:
 By uncovering an agent’s instrumental power discourse one can as-
sess what instruments of policy are conceived as available to it and 
as a result make predictions on said agent’s behaviour.
Discourse theory rests on how the articulation and re-articulation of certain ele-
ments in a given discourse serve to fixate it.”The purpose of the discourse analysis 
is to reveal what myths about society as an objective reality that are implied in 
speech and action” (Winther & Phillips 1999, p. 47 translated here), this is also 
the point of departure for this analytical perspective.
From this one is able to establish what kind of power a nation will exercise by 
finding out how power is articulated in government and foreign policy discourse.
By reducing the state to a single agent one can establish the conception of avail-
able power instruments and make predictions on possible and potential state be-
haviour. In effect the analysis will look for references to (articulations of) the dif-
ferent instruments of power usage outlined in section 3 in order to sketch a model 
of Chinese foreign policy. This could be done schematically with a simple calcu-
lation of the most common uses. This however is a cold way of describing lan-
guage and may not always capture how things are expressed in relation to what is 
emphasized and what isn’t. Of course the frequency of a sign indicates its stand-
ing, but it still seems that a judgement based on what is perceived as important 
captures the nodal points of a discourse better. It is of course possible to further 
this perspective to approach domestic policy as well, especially in light of how the 
instruments of statecraft, as conceptualized by David A Baldwin (1985), do not 
necessarily pertain to any specific area of policy. That theoretical focus is how-
ever left to further research.
The practical application of this kind of power analysis is through discourse 
analysis determining the desired outcome for the agent and then through logics of 
equivalence trying to establish how the agent thinks this is best achieved. By look-
ing at how the agent puts positive emphasis on certain actions in relation to the 
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goal and negative emphasis on other actions one can draw conclusions as to what 
practises are seen as positive and from this conclude that these modes of actions 
are more likely to be employed. Previously I defined discourse as the conscious 
space from within an agent makes his decisions. From this perspective, analyzing 
power agents entails trying to chart this conscious space and from this make pre-
dictions on possible and likely actions of an agent.
5.2 Characteristics of Chinese instrumental power 
discourse (nodal points)
5.2.1 Stability
Stability seems to be one of the key nodal points of Chinese discourse in the Secu-
rity Council. It is continuously referred to in a non-questioning manner, often ex-
pressed as a non-questioned goal of policy and once expressed with a positive af-
filiation to “strategic importance” (Yishan 2006/02/27). As such we could deduce 
that this nodal point can indicate what kind of power China is. By building logics 
of equivalence around this nodal point we are able to deduce what actions China 
deems likely to yield the desired stability. It is expressed how the AMIS (African 
union Mission in Sudan) force and later a UN operation could help stabilize the 
Darfour region (Guangya 2006/04/25 & Guangya 2006/08/31), It has however
also been expressed however that reaching stability requires dialogue between 
concerned parties as well as calls for constructive negotiations (Guangya
2006/01/27 & Zhenmin 2006 & Zhenmin 2006/09/13 & Jun 2007/10/21). A ver-
sion of stability is expressed as the consolidation of peace to which sanctions is 
put as a negative to (Zhenmin 2006/08/09). Stability is also put at opposite ends 
with what is referred to as a “violence for violence” and “toughness for tough-
ness” logic (Guangya 2006/12/12). Another positive relation to stability is the 
concept of economic development (Guangya 2007/09/23), and stability is put to in 
a positive context with a more generalized form of development (Jiechi 
2007/09/25 & Yi 2008/04/16). How can this then be conceptualized in a way that 
gives us an indication of how China is likely to act as a power?
Well, we can tell that with stability as goal of policy and the reaching of that 
goal deemed more likely through means related to soft power, with the exception 
of the reliance of peacekeeping force in the Darfour region dialogue and devel-
opment are stressed. In the earlier developed conceptualizations of different in-
struments of hard and soft power we can fit dialogue under diplomacy (soft 
power). And while economic development implies the use of a “carrot” of eco-
nomic character it also relates to institution building, an instrument Nye explicitly 
calls a soft power capacity (Nye 2004, p. 8). This taken in the context of the Chi-
nese aversion to sanctions seems to imply a soft power approach. It is however 
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also expressed that a military force can provide for stability, a relatively clear cut 
example of a hard power instrument. 
This dual articulation of hard and soft power instruments of course implies 
that China could be the previously suggested agent characterized as a smart 
power, however in the previous discussion of smart power it was suggested that in 
order to determine whether a state could be characterized as a smart power it had 
to be established that hard and soft power were used in a mutually reinforcing 
manner. So in order to make such a conclusion further empirical study is required 
since smart power implies success, it is however possible to dub China a potential 
smart power. Looking back at the statements though, one can deduce that there is 
an emphasis on soft power instruments.
5.2.2 Cooperation and all parties concerned
Another element in discourse found in the statements to the Security Council is a 
stressing of cooperation and concern for all parties involved in a conflict, espe-
cially explicit in the statements concerning terrorism (Guangya 2006/01/27
2006/02/21 & Jiechi 2007/09/25 & Yi 2008/04/16 & Yishan 2006/05/30 &
Zhenmin 2006/08/09, 2006/12/13, 2006/09/13, 2007/08/28, 2007/10/11). This can 
be correlated to the soft power instrument of diplomacy as most of the references 
to cooperation also receive a positive connotation to dialogue. We cannot however 
easily conceptualize this in a way that will give us an indication of potential ac-
tions by China, since cooperation is not generally expressed as an end in itself but 
merely a mean. This nodal point of instrumental power discourse gives us how-
ever an indication that in the Chinese instrumental power discourse cooperation or 
multilateralism generally receives a positive connotation. The question of multi-
lateral diplomacy highlights one of the problems with the empirical records, as 
discussed earlier they are riddled in politics, and the turn to multilateralism in di-
plomacy is a global phenomenon which blossomed with the explosion of states
and spread of democratic ideas after World War II (Berridge 2005, p. 170). It is 
important not to rush to conclusions and a discourse has to be examined in its dis-
cursive context. Talks of multilateralism may have a genuine positive standing in 
Chinese instrumental power discourse but it may also be the result of the diplo-
matic setting in which the statements were made. The assessment of the agents 
preferred actions must take into consideration the setting, and possible hegemonic 
discourses that may exist. A focus on multilateralism is possibly such a discourse.
Cooperation could of course also be conceived as a way of accumulating hard 
power means, but the way cooperation seems to be approached in the Chinese in-
strumental power discourse suggests an inclination towards the soft power aspect.
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5.2.3 Mutual trust, a friendly China
In emphasising traits of itself, stressing China as a friend or friendly actor is a 
continuously occurring characteristic (Guangya 2006/01/27, 2007/09/23 & Jiechi 
2007/09/25). Likewise trust seems to be a concept that receives attention (Guan-
gya 2006/08/31 2006/12/12 & Zhenmin 2007/08/28), highlighted with principles 
concerning mutuality (Jiechi 2007/09/25). This to should be view in light of the 
context in which the statements are made since being “friendly” is basically a re-
quirement in international relations and diplomacy. But the usage of such a con-
cept in discourse still suggests an awareness of the soft power instruments of per-
suasion.
5.2.4 Force
Force is not really a prominent concept in the Chinese discourse, but will be ad-
dressed as it is the primal instrument of hard power. The use of force, the ultimate 
form of coercion generally receives a bad connotation (Guangya 2006/08/31, 
Zhenmin 2006/08/11). However it also sometimes receives a positive connotation 
as a practical mean to reaching stability (Guangya 2007/09/23 & Yi 2008/04/16). 
As such force may in certain cases seem to be a viable alternative in Chinese dis-
course that cannot be overlooked. It can thus be characterized as an antagonism of 
Chinese instrumental power discourse as its definition is contested.
5.2.5 Summary
Briefly summarized, one could place the different articulated nodal points of the 
Chinese discourse in the manner described in figure 1.1
Figure 4.1: Instruments revealed by discourse analysis
A brief look at the division between hard and soft power instruments seem to sug-
gest that China’s discourse shows an emphasis on soft power means of reaching 
desired outcomes. Sanctions were an available concept however there was an 
aversion against their usage. The use of force was not necessarily seen as a nega-
tive indicating that is seen as a possible action for China. Still in reading the 
Hard Power (Coercive) in-
struments
Soft Power (Persuasive) in-
struments
Military Force Dialogue
Economic Aid (Carrot) Cooperation
Sanctions Diplomacy
Economic Aid (influence)
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statements the image of a soft power seems predominant. In figure 4.2 the instru-
ments are arranged in another manner to better visualize this.
Figure 4.2: Instruments divided by preference
In finding military force both as a preference and aversion we can conclude that it 
is a possible course of action though will probably be employed with caution. This 
division makes it clear that among the preferred soft power instruments seem to 
dominate. There also seems to be little change in the character of statements over 
time and therefore we can conclude that this discourse is fairly rigid.
5.3 Chinese foreign policy
There is an inherent problem with the analysis’ linguistic focus: That is that it 
doesn’t take actions into consideration and actions as we know sometimes speak 
louder than words. While Laclau and Mouffe claim that everything is discourse as 
actions also are given meaning through discourse, both still need to be examined 
for a complete analysis. To ascertain the validity of the nodal points the analysis 
uncovered this section looks at other researchers conclusions in trying to charac-
terize Chinese foreign policy. Contrasting these against the findings of the dis-
course analysis will help to complement the shortcomings of a purely linguistic 
approach.
Wang (2007) reaches a similar conclusion to the discourse analysis in his brief 
analysis of Chinese foreign policy looking in part at how China used a multilateral 
approach through the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to 
achieve stability crucial to China’s economic development (p. 39). He reaches the 
conclusion that China is likely to continue its cooperative policy as this policy has 
proven to be constructive (Wang 2007, p 41). Rex Li arrived at the conclusion that
the peaceful approach China has taken stems from pragmatism as China is in part 
restrained by its interdependence with trading partners (Li in Zhao 2004, p. 46-
47).  
Instruments positively concep-
tualized (preference)
Instruments negatively con-
ceptualized (aversion)
Cooperation [soft power] Sanctions (hard power)
Dialogue [soft power] Military force (hard power)
Diplomacy [soft power]
Economic Aid (influence) [soft 
power]
Economic Aid (carrot)[(hard 
power]
Military force (hard power)
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These conclusions correspond well with the image of China portrayed in its 
own discourse, as we have already established that cooperation serves primarily as 
a soft power instrument. Although there is also analysis of Chinese foreign policy 
that challenges the characteristics that have been pointed out such as the indica-
tions of preference on multilateralism and cooperation, Wu Xinbo concludes that 
while China expresses enthusiasm about multilateralism it still prefers bilateralism 
(Xinbo in Zhao, p. 65). But it could as already suggested be related to the fact that 
multilateralism is part of a hegemonic international discourse through which 
China must express itself.  
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6 Conclusions
6.1 Chinese power characterized
What then can be said about the Chinese character of power? The previous dis-
course analysis suggests that China can be expected to turn primarily to soft 
power instruments. Since China’s instrumental power discourse seems to show an 
emphasis on what we have characterized as instruments of soft power we could 
characterize China as a soft power. However China was in its discourse not a 
complete stranger to instruments of hard power. A look back at the definition of 
smart power tells us that smart power is the mutually reinforcing use of both hard 
and soft power, in short a dual use. From this perspective China stands as a poten-
tial smart power, but the practical conceptualizations for analysis presented in this 
essay is not sufficient in providing the last piece of the puzzle, that relating to the 
degree in which the different instruments are used. It was earlier suggested that 
the analysis could be applied in a purely schematic sense, such an approach to the 
analysis would provide for a template on which calculations of degree could be 
based upon. While this prima facie would seem to give more validity to ones con-
clusion it is not the case, especially in light of the context from which these em-
pirical records are taken out of. A more statistical approach was hinted at with the 
structure described in figures 4.1 and 4.2. But as already discussed these didn’t re-
flect the complexities of the discourse to a satisfactory level.
We must of course take into account the ever changing nature of discourse, 
hence this characterization should only be thought of as the current character of 
Chinese instrumental power discourse. Making predictions based on this analysis 
is thus more suited towards the near future. To conclude we can then characterize 
China as a soft power user and therefore expect that China’s will employ primar-
ily instruments of soft character. We can expect China to insist on dialogue and 
diplomacy and avert from using coercive means such as sanctions. 
6.2 Evaluation of the analytical perspective
The purpose of creating the analytical perspective was in order to make an as-
sessment of the kind of power China was, but it could also of course be applied to 
other agents acting in a number of fields. This was necessary in light of the con-
cept provided by the discussion of the particularity of the EU as a power (Sjursen 
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2006, 169). This implied that not only could power be used in different ways, but 
the reliance on different power instruments could be portrayed as characteristic 
for that power agent. This meant that there can be a qualitative difference between 
power users, not just usages of power. The need/possibility to sketch out these 
characteristics could become a valuable tool in making predictions on the behav-
iour of an agent. I argue that looking through this perspective actually has pro-
vided us with a sketching of the face of Chinese power, a sketch that could be 
used as a template in predicting Chinese policy. A lingering problem of course is 
that this essay lacks the empirical footing to ascertain that this is the case. The 
discourse perspective which this essay adheres to does not accredit actions any ex-
tra-discursive meaning. While things exist and actions take place outside dis-
course they will always be given meaning only through discourse (Howarth 2000, 
p. 104, Winther & Phillips 1999, p. 42). Meaning aside the analysis here has been 
from a strict linguistic perspective and a evaluation of actions is necessary to 
make a conclusive analysis. As both actions and language are given meaning 
through discourse, a complete discourse analysis looks at both. But the perspec-
tive serves to cast light on an agent’s conceptions of the tools available to them
and which tools are favoured, and it has produced results. It could be argued that 
the analytical perspective may be working but applied to such rhetorical material 
all it produces is a reflection of smoke and mirrors. A conceptualization of a show 
put on to appease the international community. A real assessment would require 
an analysis of the discourse taking place in the upper echelons of Chinese politics, 
where policy is formed, not merely expressed. Of course this would be a prefer-
able approach but a strict adherence to such empirical records renders the perspec-
tive somewhat inept at dealing with what is was designed for, since these records 
are seldom easily accessed. Of course a state that speaks in one way and acts in a 
quite different manner will probably loose its credibility sooner or later.
But let us step back to the origins and purpose of the discourse analysis. “The 
purpose of the discourse analysis is to reveal what myths about society as an ob-
jective reality are implied in speech and action” (Winther & Phillips 1999, p. 47 
translated here), a successful discourse analysis is thus a revelation of what is 
conceived to be objective. An actor so skilful that he in his public rhetoric man-
ages to portray his worldview as something other than it is deserves credit as this 
requires a complete overhaul of his conceived notion of the objective, a task com-
plicated enough for an outsider let alone for the party concerned. I’m not saying it 
could not be done - in fact it could be a very useful skill in social relations - it 
merely seems unlikely. Besides such an actor would of course be using modes of 
persuasion, or what is here referred to as an instrument of soft power. Deception is 
as already known a powerful tool of persuasion.
6.2.1 Weaknesses of the perspective
One of the most prominent problems with the analytical perspective is that is con-
text sensitive, trying to discern a particular agent’s discourse requires one to be 
mindful of potentially existing hegemonic discourses. This was highlighted by the 
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manner in which multilateralism seemed a preferred action of China while other 
analyses of China say otherwise. This could be avoided by first identifying any 
hegemonic discourses in the context in which an agent’s discourse is analyzed.
The analysis of China actually proved that it was possible to intercept such a prob-
lem merely by taking into consideration a potential existence of a hegemonic dis-
course. It didn’t require a previous discourse analysis of the contextual discourse.
Still it is a weakness, since this does not mean that all potential hegemonic dis-
course where accounted for.
Another weakness of the perspective is as previously noted that a more ap-
pealing empirical material for study of this kind would be the talks taking place 
behind closed doors. While states sometimes have ways of eavesdropping through 
these doors, these tools are rarely available to scientists, at least not as a fresh 
commodity, and since discourses are not rigid entities such analysis may seem fu-
tile in giving us tools to predict an actor’s behaviour.
Another limitation possibly conceived is that this perspective simply accepts 
the definition of soft and hard power, but as already pointed out this perspective 
was simply chosen in order to gain reference points for analysis. Just like the 
agent is restrained by its discourse so is the analyst. The discerning of different in-
struments of power requires that these instruments can be conceptualized in the 
analytical discourse.
6.2.2 Strengths of the perspective
What positive aspects can be found with a discourse analytical approach? Firstly, 
in light of the fact that the analysis did produce a result corresponding fairly well 
to other estimations of Chinese foreign policy, we can conclude that the analysis 
made from a discourse perspective is less time consuming. There is no need to
search the entire spectre of decisions and actions of foreign policy and then look 
to their origin in order to make assessments and predictions on foreign policy. In-
stead through this perspective we look directly at possible actions through what is 
conceived as possible and preferable. While a valid assessment may require some 
work after the analysis in order to establish which course of actions is more likely 
in a specific case, the analytical perspective gives an immediate indication of what 
needs to be looked into in further detail. This perspective on power analysis can as 
such be used in order to make brief assessments of an agent’s character to rule out 
certain behaviours, thus enabling the researcher to use this analysis in furthering 
the research without being stuck with the arduous task of assessing possible and 
likely behaviours from a myriad of different empirical sources. While one often 
can rely on others’ analyses, these are not always readily available, or when avail-
able not looking at the aspect one desires to look into.
Another strength of the analytical perspective relates to one of the weaknesses 
put forward, the one pertaining to the context sensitivity of the perspective, even 
though the most desired material might not always be available one can almost 
always find relevant material, especially in an international environment since 
states now are under constant scrutiny, making the need for public diplomacy a 
24
key element of any strategy, as media has created a involuntary transparency of 
state affairs, highlighted most recently in the war in Iraq (Mor 2006, p. 157, 162). 
More and more actors have gone public, especially governmental actors, through 
this publicity power actors are forced to create material that through discourse 
analysis can be studied.
Returning to the problem of making power analysis in a discourse, another
strength presents itself. As stated in the previous discussion of this limitation the 
analyst is also trapped in a discourse, but should an analysis present an instrument 
of power that cannot be properly categorized this illuminates possible shortcom-
ings and restraint of the power discourse within one makes the analysis.
6.3 Future research
The perspective developed in this essay certainly deserves more attention since it
has managed to effectively characterize the Chinese power agent and the means 
available to that agent. However the fruitfulness of looking from this perspective
needs further testing to prove its reliability.
One could also develop the different conceptualized instruments of power in 
order to make better and clearer characterizations of agents. Simply relying on the 
distinction between hard and soft power means is probably not optimal. A devel-
oped system of instruments of power would serve to make more detailed accounts 
of the character of an agent.
The perspective should thus both be further developed in itself to give it a 
sharper edge as well as be tested on other agents and compared to more conven-
tional analyses to strengthen reliability.
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